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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many Latin American countries have insti-
tuted privatization and deregulation policies as part of a major
structural change from an active industrial policy to a market
economy.' Under the market system, each individual or firm may
buy and sell freely, with the government enforcing property
rights.2 The competition between numerous individuals and firms,
all acting in their own best interest, ensures that the market will
offer the combination of goods and services most valued by con-
sumers.- As these countries move towards a free market system,
1. Several authors have chronicled the movement towards privatization of state-owned
enterprises. See, e.g., L. GRAY COWAN, PRIVATIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1990);
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PRIVATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT (Steve H.
Hanke ed., 1987); PIERRE GUISLAIN, DIVEsTrrURE OF STATE ENTERPRISES; AN OVERVIEW OF
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (World Bank Tech. Paper No. 186, 1992); CHARLES VUYLSTEKE,
TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (World Bank Tech. Paper No.
88, 1988); Albert Fishlow, The Latin American State, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at 61.
2. Adam Smith noted that an optimal government has three functions: (1) It provides
for the national defense; (2) it administers justice; and (3) it erects and maintains public
works and institutions. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 651 (Edwin Cannan et al. eds., The Modern Library 1937) (1776). This
third duty foreshadows the concept of a public good, defined as a noncompetitive (consump-
tion by one does not preclude use by others) and nonexclusive (once produced. for one, the
product is available to all) product. Id. Given that public goods are noncompetitive in con-
sumption and nonexclusive in production, inducing a market economy to produce an opti-
mal amount of public goods is difficult. Thus, efficiency may suggest that the government
produce goods which have a strong "public" characteristic.
3. The concept of market failure describes situations in which the market fails to gener-
ate the optimal result. Such failures, however, can often be traced to an inability to set up
the foundations of a market system. For example, pollution occurs when the market system
fails to assign a property right to the air, water, or land. If everyone owns the air, economic
decisions are based on a zero price for clean air. Thus, air becomes polluted and often the
market is blamed for the failure of the property rights system. One can argue that the gov-
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however, they become increasingly concerned with monopoliza-
tion.4 If a single entity captures an entire industry, monopoly could
replace state control and thus stifle the benefits of competition.'
Antitrust policy is a useful method of protecting the development
of a market economy by preventing certain forms of noncompeti-
tive behavior.
This Article presents an overview of the antitrust policies em-
ployed by Latin American countries and evaluates a number of
possible antitrust regulations. Section II discusses the historical
development of antitrust law in Latin America, introduces the
market and dominance theories of antitrust regulation, and de-
scribes the antitrust policies employed by Latin American coun-
tries. Section III presents a more detailed discussion of these anti-
trust policies. It begins by describing advocacy programs and
suggests that they may be an effective method of ensuring that
government regulations do not unduly burden competition. Next,
Section III describes the difficulties of defining an antitrust mar-
ket, a necessary step for implementing antitrust policy. It then ex-
plores anticompetitive tactics: monopolization evolves as the major
antitrust concern due to surreptitious conduct, such as price fixing
agreements, predatory actions that directly eliminate rivals, and
mergers that create market power. In each situation, branches of
the government may also create barriers to new competition. Thus,
the optimal antitrust policy must control monopolistic practices at
both the market and government levels.
This Article also discusses the anti-competitive and efficiency
explanations for various horizontal restraints, vertical agreements,
and price discrimination schemes. Active antitrust enforcement in
these areas is likely to be costly and of questionable benefit to
Latin American economies. This paper concludes by arguing that
Latin American countries need not choose between the market
power and dominance approaches to antitrust policy, but should
consider a hybrid policy that focuses only on monopoly.
ernment's obligation to administer justice includes assigning property rights as technical
change creates markets for previously ignored resources. For a more detailed discussing of
this type of market failure, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
4. For example, in discussing the economic reforms occurring in Eastern Europe and
Latin America, an executive report of the U.S. government noted a need for antitrust laws
to control price fixing and mergers that result in monopolies. 1991 PRES. EcON. REP. 210.
5. A monopolist acts in its own self-interest and would thus, restrict output and in-
crease the price to earn higher profits.
19921
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II. ANTITRUST IN LATIN AMERICA
A. General Context
In virtually all Latin American countries, antitrust policies
must be implemented on top of a history of the state's own monop-
olistic practices, such as government ownership of crucial indus-
tries, price controls, and import-substitution.
1. Government Ownership
In many Latin American countries, nationalization has long
been a standard response to perceived economic problems.7 For ex-
ample, government ownership, initially reserved for natural re-
source industries, such as oil (Mexico, Venezuela) and mining
(Brazil, Chile), has expanded to airlines (Mexico, Argentina, Bo-
livia), banking and insurance operations (Mexico, El Salvador),
telephone industries (Argentina), and even luxury hotels (El
Salvador)."
Not surprisingly, these nationalized industries perform poorly,
leaving the government saddled with debt and obsolete busi-
nesses.' Recently, governments seeking to shed operations that the
private sector can run more efficiently have implemented a process
of privatization-selling government-owned enterprises to private
6. See Lawrence F. Ebb, Transfer of Foreign Technology in Latin America: The Birth
of Antitrust Law?, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 719 (1974-75); The UNCTAD Secretariat, Control of
Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 137 (1976); Eduardo
White, El control del poder econ6mico en America Latin-Poltica y legislaci6n, 7 DER-
ECHO DE LA INTEGRACION; REVISTA JURIDICA LATINOAMERICANA [REV. JUR. LATINAM.] 13 (1974);
Eduardo White, La legislaci6n antimonbpolica y el control del poder econ6mico en
Amdrica Latina: recientes tendencias, 11 REV. JUR. LATINAM. 35 (1978) [hereinafter White,
La legislacibn].
7. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
WORLD (1989) [hereinafter DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH]; Fishlow, supra note 1, at 62-66;
Anne 0. Krueger, Government Failures in Development, J. EcON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at
9 [hereinafter Krueger, Government Failures].
8. Latin America, Bus. INT'L, Jan. 8, 1990, at 11-12; Privatisation in Latin America:
Going, going..., ECONOMIST, Mar. 23-29, 1991, at 80-82.
9. P.T. Bauer & A.A. Walters, The State of Economics, 18 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1975); Her-
nando de Soto, What's Wrong with Latin American Economies?, REASON, Oct. 1989, at 38;
Krueger, Government Failures, supra note 7, at 10-13. Philip Swan noted that "heavy pub-
lic spending programs have meant sizeable government budget deficits" and that common
policy responses included "overvalued exchange rates; trade policies biased against exports;
and domestic policies biased against the agricultural sector." Philip L. Swan, Economic Re-
form in Latin America, Bus. ECON., Apr. 1992, at 18, 18-19.
[Vol. 24:1
ANTITRUST IN LATIN AMERICA
interests. 10 Efforts in Chile and Mexico have succeeded in at-
tracting local and foreign private capital and in integrating their
markets into the world economic system. 1 For example, the gov-
ernment in Chile sells stock at preannounced dates, encourages
broad-based ownership of private pension funds, and induces
strong foreign bank involvement via debt swaps.12 Mexico has de-
veloped a system of competitive bidding in which private compa-
nies submit sealed bids to a government commission.1 3 Companies
wishing to invest may also use debt-equity swaps in certain cir-
cumstances.' 4 Overall, the privatization of state enterprises fosters
a market economy, generates tax revenue, and eliminates subsidies
to further reduce government deficits. 15
2. Price Controls
In non-state-owned industries, governments have played a less
direct, but nevertheless disruptive, role by fixing prices of certain
products. Generally, governments introduce price controls to pro-
10. Among the reasons for the failure of state-owned enterprises in the developing
world, analysts list the "staggering burden" of subsidy costs, the inability of government to
monitor the performance of state enterprises, inexperienced management, and unnecessary
constraints that management places on the enterprises. REBECCA CANDOY-SEKSE, TECH-
NIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES (World Bank Tech. Paper No. 90,
1988); COWAN, supra note 1, at 3-4; see Jeremy Main, How Latin America is Opening Up,
FORTUNE, Apr. 8, 1991, at 84 (discussing how "newly elected governments ... have thrust
their businessmen into the free market, cutting tariffs, welcoming foreign capital, [and] un-
loading hopelessly unprofitable state corporations"); see also Stephen Baker et al., Latin
America: The Big Move to Free Markets, Bus. WK., June 15, 1992, at 50 (noting that in
order to "modernize, Latin America must privatize, crush inflation, slash tariffs, open the
doors to foreign investment, and sign free-trade pacts with neighbors and eventually with
the [United States]"); INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, FOSTERING FOREIGN DIRECT IN-
VESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1990) [hereinafter FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT]. The promo-
tion of foreign direct investment, or investment associated with foreign ownership and man-
agement control, must constitute a major part of any strategy to rekindle sustained
economic development in Latin America. Id.
11. Economist Intelligence Unit, Chile, in EIU WORLD OUTLOOK (1991) [hereinafter
WORLD OUTLOOK; CHILE]; Economist Intelligence Unit, Mexico, in EIU WORLD OUTLOOK
(1991) [hereinafter WORLD OUTLOOK: MEXICO].
12. A Decade of Privatization in Latin America Offers Lessons to MNCs, Bus. INT'L,
Feb. 18, 1991, at 59 [hereinafter Decade of Privatization]; WORLD OUTLOOK: CHILE, supra
note 11, at 30-38; Swan, supra note 9, at 20.
13. Decade of Privatization, supra note 12; WORLD OUTLOOK: MExIco, supra note 11.
14. See FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 10, at 3-4; Thomas J. Trebat, Resolv-
ing the Latin American Debt Crisis: Prospects for the 1990s, Q. REv. EcoN. & Bus., Autumn
1991, at 13; Swan, supra note 9, at 21-22.
15. Milton Friedman, Using the Market for Social Development, 8 CATO J. 567, 572-73
(1989); JOHN VIc"REs & GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1988);
VUYLSTEKE, supra note 1, at 41-42.
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tect selected groups. For example, some Latin American countries
protect their urban poor with controls on food and other necessi-
ties, while others protect the rich by limiting the price of gaso-
line.16 Sometimes, governments protect selected industries by con-
trolling prices of financial capital and raw materials. 17
Imposing these policies on competitive markets distorts incen-
tives by breaking the link between the marginal value and cost of a
product."1 Moreover, price controls can stifle innovation by
preventing investors from earning a sufficient return on invest-
ment. Under international pressure, various governments have re-
cently lifted price control systems and allowed market economies
to develop. For example, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Ecuador have
begun revising prices structures for agricultural goods and energy.
Colombia also has undertaken a major price reform. 9 Abolishing
price controls may appear to have a negative effect at the outset,
as prices rise to compensate for years of artificially-depressed
levels. Eliminating price distortions, however, will cause competi-
tion among producers to increase and will ensure that prices do not
exceed costs.
3. Import Substitution
In addition to the direct intervention of nationalization and
price controls, Latin American governments tended to follow an
"import-substitution" industrial development strategy. Generally,
this involved erecting tariff barriers or quotas on imports, followed
by the establishment of a local industry to produce the goods.2 °
16. RAMOOPAL AGARWALA, PRICE DISTORTIONS AND GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 575, 1983).
17. Werner Baer, Social Aspects of Latin American Inflation, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus.,
Autumn 1991, at 45.
18. For example, price controls on food suppress production by the rural poor because
the low prices discourage work effort; rent controls prevent housing development to serve
the new migrants to the cities; low rents make housing investments unprofitable; and inter-
est rate controls stifle venture capital because the low return induces capitalists to send
their funds abroad.
19. 1991 WORLD BANK ANN. RP. 133-140.
20. In the 1950s, Raul Prebisch and H.W. Singer argued that the declining terms of
trade resulted in a long-term transfer of income from developing to developed countries. See
U.N. COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND
ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS (1950) (essay prepared by Raul Prebisch); H.W. Singer, The Distri-
bution of Gains Between Borrowing and Investing Countries, AM. EcON. REV., May 1950, at
473. Singer supported policies to develop and protect manufacturing industries of less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) in order to raise wages and prevent the overexpansion of the primary
[Vol. 24:1
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Typically, the governments gave foreign companies investment in-
centives to participate in the development process." In the long
run, the import-substitution policy not only cut off access to effi-
ciently-produced manufactured goods from the developed world,
but often limited the size of the national market by precluding re-
gional trade.
2 2
Trade restrictions induced various Latin American economies
to over-diversify and created small, inefficient corporations.2 8 Mo-
nopoly and oligopoly market structures to evolved as Latin
America broke up into small markets. Without competition, local
economies failed to perform. Small firms could take advantage of
the lack of competition to enter at an inefficient scale and sell
under the artificial, but state supported, price umbrella.
Recently, the consensus for import-substitution has all but
evaporated. Chile led the way in instituting substantial trade re-
forms.2" By 1979, Chile had eliminated its quotas and established a
uniform tariff rate of ten percent.2 5 Mexico and Bolivia followed
Chile's lead in 1985.26 Mexico liberalized its quotas and reduced its
tariffs to an average of eleven percent in 1988.27 Bolivia overhauled
its trade regime and eliminated its quotas,28 setting tariff rates at
ten percent for capital goods and seventeen percent for other prod-
ucts.2 By late 1989 and early 1990, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela
announced comprehensive import liberalization and trade re-
forms. 0 These Latin American structural reforms should set a
foundation for the growth of the a market economy.
These liberalization programs are not without their critics. A
region cannot undertake a major economic restructuring without
export sector.
21. Anne 0. Krueger, Import Substitution Versus Export Promotion, FIN. & DEv., June
1985, at 20 [hereinafter Krueger, Import Substitution].
22. See Moisks NA M, LAs EMPRESAS VENEZOLANAS: Su GERENCUA (2d ed. 1989) (a collec-
tion of essays by Venezuelan scholars on microeconomic problems endemic to Latin Ameri-
can economies).
23. Rudiger Dornbusch, The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries, J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 1992, at 69.
24. Dani Rodrik, The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1992, at 87, 88.








raising serious concerns from those who believe that the proposed
change will make them much worse off. Monopolization represents
one such concern. It would be a mistake for Latin American coun-
tries to allow private monopolies to replace the state in its control
of the market. If a small group in society gains control of key re-
sources, the group's leaders can enrich themselves at the expense
of others by restricting output and increasing prices in the con-
trolled sectors. Antitrust policy, however, may control monopoliza-
tion and preserve the benefits of competition for society.
B. History of Antitrust Policy in Latin America
The basic concept of antitrust is not new to Latin America. In
1923 Argentina enacted the region's first official antitrust policy, s
and in 1934, Mexico passed an antimonopoly law. 2 Chile imposed
an antitrust law in 1959."s Colombia and Brazil's antitrust tradi-
tions also date back thirty years.3 4
In contrast to this legislative history, antitrust in Latin
America has a sparse enforcement record. With the exception of
Chile, no country has actively enforced these laws. One could con-
clude from the enforcement records that most of these countries do
31. Represi6n de los trusts [Antitrust], Law 11,210 of Aug. 24, 1923 (Arg.), translated
in LAws oF ARGENTINA IN ENGLISH 899 (J.A. de Marval & E. de Marval trans., 1933), re-
pealed by Represi6n de monopolios, Law 12,906 of Dec. 12, 1946, CODIGO DE COMERCIO Y
LEYES COMPLEMENTARiAS ANOTADOS [C.C.L.C.A.], at 1071 (2d ed. 1970), repealed by Ley de
defensa de la compentencia, Law 22,262 of Aug. 1, 1980, ANALES DE LEGISLAC16N ARGENTINA
[A.D.L.A.], at 2521 (1980) [hereinafter Argentine Law 22,262].
32. Ley organica del articulo 28 constitucional en materia de monopolios [Organic Law
of Monopolies], DiARIo OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACI6N [D.O.], Aug. 31, 1934, amended by Decree
of Dec. 27, 1979, D.O., Jan. 8, 1980, repealed and replaced by Ley federal de compentencia
econ6mica [Federal Law of Economic Competition], D.O., Dec. 24, 1992 (Mex.) [hereinafter
Mexican Competition Law].
33. Law No. 13,305, tit. V, arts. 172-182, DIARIo OFIcIAL [D.O.], Apr. 6, 1959, amended
by Law Decree No. 211 of 1973, D.O., Dec. 22, 1973, amended by Decree No. 511 of Sep. 17,
1980, D.O., Oct. 27, 1980 (Chile) [hereinafter Chilean Decree 511].
34. See PRACrTICAS COMERMCALEs RESTRICTIVAS, NUEVO C6DIGO DE COMERCIO [NuEvo
C6D. COM.] arts. 7269-1 to 7299-4 (Colom.) (The new code of July-Sept. 1991 compiles Law
155 of Dec. 14, 1959; Law 3307 of Sept. 30, 1963; and Decree 1302 of June 1, 1964.); see also
Lei que disciplina a repressao ao abruso do poder econbmico, Law 4,137 of Sept. 10, 1962, 26
LEGISLACAO FEDERAL E MARGINALIA 314 (1962) (Braz.) [hereinafter Brazilian Law 4,137]; De-
cree No. 52,025 of May 20, 1963, 203 Revista Forense [R.F.] 422 (1963) (Braz.) (approving
the regulation of Brazilian Law 4,137); Decree No. 92,323 of Jan. 23, 1986, 293 R.F. 592
(1986) (Braz.) (approving the regulation of Brazilian Law 4,137); Law 8137 of Dec. 27, 1990,
DIsAuo OpicIAL [D.O.], Dec. 28, 1990 (Braz.) (crimes against tributary and economic order);
Law 8158 of Jan. 8, 1991, D.O., Jan. 9, 1991 (Braz.) [hereinafter Brazilian Law 8158] (sets
rules to protect competition).
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not have organized antitrust policies.35 This has partially resulted
from import-substitution policies that encouraged oligopoly and
monopoly market structures. Furthermore, rather than reserving
antitrust laws to attack market power situations, governments
have integrated them with price control policies to "protect" con-
sumers against selected price increases
s. 3
Recently, other Latin American nations have begun imple-
menting antitrust policies. Peru passed a broad antitrust law in
November 1991 that limits monopolistic and dominant firm behav-
ior."7 Venezuela followed in 1992 with regulations that likewise at-
tack monopoly and dominance.38 Argentina and Jamaica are con-
sidering revised antitrust laws, 9 while other countries are
considering implementing antitrust policies in their constitutions.
40
C. Antitrust Policy in the Market Economy
Simply stated, antitrust policy attempts to prevent monopoli-
zation and to preserve competition benefits for society. Anti-mo-
nopoly policies must proceed on two tracks: (1) limiting coordina-
tion between existing competitors; and (2) maintaining ease of
entry for new competitors.4 1
35. JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION-OVERVIEW § 1.21[2][b]
(1987); White, La legislaci6n, supra note 6, at 38-40.
36. UNCTAD Secretariat, supra note 6, at 139.
37. Law Decree No. 701 of July 11, 1991, [1991] NORMAS LEGALES 126 (Peru) [hereinaf-
ter Peruvian Law 701].
38. Ley para promover y proteger el ejercicio de Ia libre competencia, G.O. No. 34.880
of Jan. 13, 1992, GACETA LEGAL-RAMIREZ & GARAY, Jan. 15, 1992 (Venez.) [hereinafter Ven-
ezuelan Law 34,880].
39. Mark Dutz, Competition Law to Support Market-Oriented Reform: The Argentine
Context (March 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review); Enrique Szewach, Desregulacibn y Monopolio, AMrro FINANCIERO
(Buenos Aires, Arg.), Nov. 6, 1991, at 18; Competition Policy in Jamaica (Jan. 23, 1991)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
40. For example, in accordance with article 110 of its constitution, El Salvador will
enact a series of laws designed to protect consumers and deter monopolistic practices. El
Salvador Agreements: The Path to Peace, U.N. Observer Mission in El Salvador
(ONUSAL), at 82, U.N. Doc. DPI-1208 (1992).
41. That the United States has more experience in the first track has more to do with
institutional structures than any explicit choice. The policy of the United States also in-
cludes lowering entry barriers through, for example, successful deregulatory and pro-entry
policies in the transportation and communication industries. For a discussion of deregula-
tion in transportation, see 1986 PREs. EcoN. REP. 159. For an overview of deregulation in
telecommunications, see 1982 PRES. ECON. REP. 164. The authors believe that the primary
and secondary education markets still suffer under state monopolies. In the United States,
local government offers primary and secondary educational services through a public school
46 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
For transitional economies, some residual regulations will exist
that slow or prevent entry into certain sectors. Moreover, en-
trenched bureaucrats may attempt to justify their continued exis-
tence by accommodating special interests and shifting from direct
to more subtle forms of regulation. These regulations can range
from non-tariff import barriers to complex licensing requirements
that deter domestic entry. While some regulations may be politi-
cally necessary, the antitrust office can serve as a public advocate
for easy entry and relatively free trade.2
Analysts ground antitrust policy on two competing theo-
ries-market power and dominance. The United States enforces an
antitrust policy based on market power, making illegal any activity
that restricts competition and leads to higher consumer prices."3
Market power theories can be justified with either monopoly or oli-
gopoly considerations. The European Economic Community (EEC)
and many member countries employ a dominance-based antitrust
policy." Dominance encompasses the ability of large firms to influ-
ence the commercial viability or opportunities of small rivals and
trading partners.45 Under a dominance policy, antitrust may pro-
tect the long-term interests of suppliers and competitors, rather
than the short-term interests of consumers. Dominance policies,
however, may allow the formation of large firms, which may lead to
lower consumer prices because large firms can achieve economies
of scale.
Both types of antitrust policy-market power and domi-
nance-address the issue of monopolies.46 A firm can monopolize a
system at basically a zero price to parents. In effect, this has established an education mo-
nopoly by pricing well below cost. Of course, a little fringe competition exists as some con-
sumers desire specialized educational services. Education reform plans offer all parents tui-
tion vouchers that would be good at the school of the parent's choice. Such programs would
break the government education monopoly and allow a competitive market to develop. See
generally DAVID F. LINOWES, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: To-
WARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988).
42. This Article labels all of these general policies as "advocacy" in later analysis.
43. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF (1978) [hereinafter BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) [hereinafter PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW]; Frank H. Easter-
brook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1984).
44. See generally ROGER A. BONER & REINALD KRUEGER, THE BASICS OF ANTITRUST
POLICY: A REVIEW OF TEN NATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (World Bank Tech.
Paper No. 160, 1991) (describing the contrast between market power and dominance-based
antitrust policy).
45. Id. at 15.
46. Although both market power and dominance theories address structural and behav-
[Vol. 24:1
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market by: (1) coordinating with its rivals (price fixing); (2) driving
its rivals out of business (predation); or (3) acquiring its significant
rivals (mergers). No single strategy requires the firm to obtain a
perfect monopoly. A monopolist must simply eliminate sufficient
competition to enable it to impose an anticompetitive price in-
crease. While no clear lines exist, a cutoff at a ninety percent share
of a properly-defined market is usually high enough, but a sixty
percent share is often too low to establish a monopoly." '
Price fixing remains an antitrust concern because an agree-
ment among competitors on price can injure consumers. Price-fix-
ing agreements can monopolize a market simply by setting a price
for all the competitors to charge, much like the firms may have
done in the past with the government's blessing. Alternatively, an
agreement can divide customers so that each firm obtains a mo-
nopoly in a market segment, such as a neighborhood, an end use,
or a specific list of customers. Because such price fixing agreements
undermine the market process and restrict consumer choice, they
are a major concern for antitrust regulators.
Monopolization by predation usually involves specific unilat-
eral actions that a firm undertakes to harm competitors. These ac-
tions are more difficult to identify than simple price-fixing because
unilateral actions to disadvantage competitors often define compe-
tition. Thus, a competitive policy aimed at monopolization by pre-
dation must have a narrow focus to avoid harming the competitive
process.
The final core policy involves mergers. Generally, firms should
not accomplish through merger what the antitrust laws prohibit
through bans on price-fixing and predation. Moreover, some argue
that merger enforcement should reach transactions that signifi-
cantly concentrate a market and facilitate oligopolistic pricing. 8 In
oligopolies, the limited number of firms may choose not to compete
and raise prices towards the monopoly levels. Others would suggest
that oligopolistic pricing exists only in theory and therefore, re-
quires no action.' 9 Regardless of the merger policy, efficiencies
ioral concerns, market power analysis more commonly proscribes mergers and less com-
monly proscribes behavior.
47. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 166.
48. See, e.g., id. at 199-216.
49. See, e.g., Laurence E. Gesell & Martin T. Farris, Antitrust Irrelevance in Air




should always be a consideration.
Antitrust concerns can go beyond price fixing, predation, and
mergers. Competitors can enter into horizontal restraints con-
straining competition on various non-price aspects. Similarly, man-
ufacturers can enter into vertical agreements with customers to
limit product sales. Under special conditions, these agreements
may facilitate monopolistic pricing. Firms can also use various
forms of price discrimination, including tying,"0 to market their
products. If the pricing scheme deters entry, the scheme may be
anti-competitive. However, horizontal restraints, vertical agree-
ments, and price discrimination often produce efficient and pro-
competitive results.5 1 Moreover, in comparison to the potential for
direct monopolization, anti-competitive effects may be relatively
small. Thus, while one cannot effectively argue that this behavior
should always be legal, one can argue that it should not always be
an enforcement priority.
D. Overview of Antitrust Policies
Table 1 presents an overview of the antitrust policies in
twenty Latin American countries.5 2 The first column lists the coun-
try with the year of the last amendment to the antitrust law in
brackets.53 If the country has never passed a law implementing
policy, no year appears next to the name of.the country. Column
two of the table contains basic information about the structure of
the antitrust laws. Almost two-thirds of the countries have anti-
trust provisions in their constitutions. These regulations usually
amount to a general ban on monopoly pricing. A few countries,
such as Venezuela and Peru, also have laws that further define the
antitrust policy. Other countries, including Argentina and Guate-
mala, base their policies directly on law either as stand-alone legis-
50. A tying arrangement is one in which the seller agrees to sell a product on the condi-
tion that the buyer also agree to purchase an additional product. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1519 (6th ed. 1990).
51. See generally BORK,. ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at chs. 11, 13, 20.
52. For cites to antitrust policies in all twenty Latin American countries, see Appendix,
infra. The table omits Jamaica because its British traditions differ from the Iberian heritage
of Latin America. This difference is legally significant: Jamaica operates under a common
law system and Latin America under a civil law system. Jamaica is currently considering an
antitrust policy that would make price fixing and resale price maintenance illegal per se,
tying and abuse (predation) illegal for dominant firms, and various other horizontal and
vertical agreements illegal under a rule-of-reason.
53. The year appears without brackets if no change in policy has ever occurred.
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lation or as part of the commercial code. A third type of law is an
administrative decree. These laws represent government mandates
that have become part of the country's legal structure. A number
in parenthesis following the relevant abbreviation denotes the
number of changes or modifications in the laws or decrees. For ex-
ample, our data suggest that Chile has not changed its law but has
amended the meaning of the law with two decrees.
The third column indicates whether the country's antitrust
policy promotes price control by the government. As the table indi-
cates, most Latin American governments have been involved in
setting prices. The laws often create maximum resale price mainte-
nance systems that define the prices at which controlled goods can
trade. Such price controls may prevent monopoly pricing, but at
the cost of limiting the market's ability to adjust. As previously
discussed, Latin American countries have generally begun phasing
out their price control systems.
The fourth column presents data on how the law enforcement
process functions. Some countries allow more than one approach,
while others allow only one type of enforcement activity. The
courts are directly involved in judicial, civil, and criminal policies.
The government brings the judicial cases, and private parties bring
civil enforcement cases. The government alone enforces criminal
law, which can lead to imprisonment of an antitrust violator. The
administrative-judicial policy involves an initial administrative ap-
proach followed by judicial review, while an executive-judicial pol-
icy vests the control of antitrust in the executive branch with judi-
cial review. Pure administrative policies appear to dispense with
the court's ability to review the actions of the enforcement agency.
Other policies involve either legislative action, in which the legisla-
ture takes the lead in law enforcement, or executive action, in
which the executive branch controls policy directly. The final cate-
gory, labeled federal, acts as a catch-all category when it is not
clear how the antitrust laws are enforced.
The effectiveness of a regulatory policy depends, in part, upon
the choice of an enforcement system. Although antitrust is a classic
example of "public interest" regulation, the regulators may none-
theless be "captured" or co-opted by the targets of the regula-
tion. 4 If the targets of the regulation obtain implicit control of the
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regulators, antitrust policies may not protect consumers from mo-
nopolistic pricing. On the other hand, if the antitrust agency re-
mains insulated from political control by the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the government, the probability of capture is
lowered.5 There would also be less concern if courts could effec-
tively review administrative decisions.
The table shows that a number of countries with active poli-
cies use administrative systems, many with judicial review, while
others rely on government systems more at risk of capture. Vene-
zuela probably has the best system, with an independent antitrust
agency subject to judicial review." Argentina and Chile have inde-
pendent antitrust agencies, but they must obtain government con-
currence on final orders.5 7 Thus, while the possibility of capture
exists, the potentially public nature of the actions clearly raises the
cost of political interference. Brazil's agency appears to have an
independent ability to litigate, but the Council's members still de-
fer to the government.5 " In all of these countries, firms can appeal
adverse decisions. In three other countries-Columbia, Peru, and
Mexico-the government controls antitrust enforcement." Only in
criminal cases may parties appeal to the courts. Although this
55. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission can enforce the laws indepen-
dently of the executive branch, while the Department of Justice remains under the control
of the President. In Germany, the Cartel Office acts independently, except for merger deci-
sions which may be appealed to the Economics Ministry. Both countries allow for judicial
review. For more details on these and other countries, see BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44,
at 22-27.
56. Venezuelan Law 34,880, supra note 38, arts. 19-29.
57. See Guillermo Cabanellas & Wolf Etzrodt, The New Argentine Antitrust Law:
Competition as an Economic Policy Instrument, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 34, 40 (1983); Ar-
gentine Law 22,262, supra note 31, arts. 16, 19, 24, 26, 29, 30; VoN KALNOWSKI, supra note
35, at § 7.03[20]; Chilean Decree 511, supra note 33, art. 6.
58. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 35, at § 7.03[171; Irec6 de Azevedo Marques Trench &
Juliana L.B. Viegas, Brazil, in SURVEY OF FOREIGN LAWS AND REGULATIONS AFFECTING INTER-
NATIONAL FRANCHISING 30-31 (Philip F. Zeidman ed., 2d ed. 1989) (prepared by A.B.A. Sec.
of Antitrust Law). In 1991, Brazil charged the National Secretariat of Economic Rights, an
office of the Ministry of Justice, with inspecting and prosecuting antitrust violations. See
Brazilian Law 8158, supra note 34.
59. See NUEVO C6D. CoM. art 7294 (Colom.) (charging the Superintendency of Industry
and Commerce, part of the Ministry of Economic Development, with enforcing the laws);
Peruvian Law 701, supra note 37, arts. 7-14 (delegating from the National Congress to the
Executive Branch the power to legislate against monopolistic practices that control and re-
strict free competition); Mexican Competition Law, supra note 32, art. 23 (describing the
Federal Competition Commission as an autonomous administrative body in the Ministry of
Trade and Industrial Promotion with responsibility and authority to investigate and combat
monopolies, monopolistic practices, and trusts under the terms of the new law); id. art. 7
(providing that the federal executive is exclusively responsible for determining which goods
and services may be subject to maximum prices).
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structure seems more likely to suffer from regulatory capture, it
may provide the only choice for countries without well-functioning
institutions.
Civil enforcement also merits discussion. Some argue that
when the government's antitrust resources are limited, policy must
allow civil enforcement of the law. On the other hand, private liti-
gants may use the antitrust laws to protect themselves against
competitors. Unless a well-developed and experienced court system
exists, civil suits would not be advisable. There are a few other
approaches to reduce the risk of counterproductive litigation. First,
one could follow the lead of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela and
require all civil cases to be filed with the antitrust commission.1
The government could then litigate significant cases to maximize
the likelihood of an efficient outcome, certify other less significant,
but reasonable, cases for private litigation, and close the unjusti-
fied ones without a chance for a trial."1 To further control private
litigation, countries could implement the "British rule" in which
the unsuccessful party pays all legal fees and court costs.62 Reform-
ers in the United States have proposed this change to enhance
American competitiveness." Finally, courts could limit damages to
actual injuries and court costs. To allow private parties to obtain
multiple damages creates unnecessary incentives to litigate instead
of engaging in competition in the marketplace.
E. Per se, Rule-of-Reason, and Dominance Antitrust Laws
The rest of the table classifies the antitrust laws into three
categories: per se, rule-of-reason, and dominance. For each cate-
gory, evidence must be gathered to demonstrate an actual violation
of the law. Thus, all three types of antitrust policy require the en-
forcement agency or court to conduct detailed investigations of be-
havior. Additionally, the rule-of-reason and dominance standards
60. Argentine Law 22,262, supra 31, arts. 19, 24, 26, and 30; Brazilian Law 4,137, supra
note 34, arts. 27, 28; Venezuelan Law 34,880, supra note 38, art. 32.
61. This approach would enable the enforcement agency to serve as a gatekeeper for
litigation. Cases having a broad-based impact on the economy would be litigated by the
government to economize resources so that other private parties would not have to bring
similar cases. Private litigation would be allowed for marginal cases that would primarily
affect only the parties involved in the dispute. Finally, weak cases would be closed to econo-
mize on transaction costs. It is unclear if Latin American enforcement agencies follow this
approach.
62. See 1992 PRES. ECON. REP. 162.
63. Id.
[Vol. 24:1
ANTITRUST IN LATIN AMERICA
require investigating the economic structure. By its very nature,
the classification scheme is somewhat subjective. However, this pa-
per tries to follow simple rules to minimize the potential for error.
Per se laws create an absolute ban on certain behavior.6 4 Ex-
amples of such behavior include predation and price fixing in Bo-
livia, and mergers that result in monopolies in Venezuela. The en-
forcement agency or court need only determine whether the
behavior occurred to find liability. In general, per se cases will re-
quire less enforcement effort than rule-of-reason or dominance
cases.
Rule-of-reason laws require analysis beyond a simple finding
of whether the behavior occurred. Conduct is illegal only if it has a
net anti-competitive effect."5 Thus, the enforcement agency or
court must look at the effect of the behavior and balance the inju-
ries with any potential benefits to evaluate liability. Rule-of-reason
laws may have a much broader application than per se laws be-
cause liability depends on the specific facts. Examples include vari-
ous horizontal monopoly concerns in Argentina, both horizontal
and vertical issues in Peru, and resale price maintenance in
Venezuela.
Finally, under the dominance concept, behavior is illegal only
if: (1) a dominant firm performs it; and (2) the behavior injures a
protected group of consumers or business associates.6 Dominance
64. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 18-19; Donald L. Beschle, "What,
Never? Well, Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to per se Antitrust
Illegality, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 471 (1987); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the per se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE
L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason]; Wesley J. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Re-
view of Antitrust Developments: Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency, and the per se Rule,
33 UCLA L. REv. 1019 (1986); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the per se and Rule of
Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991).
65. See BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 33-41; see also Bork, Rule of Rea-
son, supra note 64, 74 YALE L.J. at 801-805, 829-32; John R. Carter, From Peckham to
White: Economic Welfare and the Rule of Reason, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 275 (1980); Ernest
Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham, Making Sense Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 CAsE W. REs. L.
REv. 155 (1984-85); Keith Leffler, Toward a Reasonable Rule of Reason: Comments, 28 J.L.
& EcON. 381 (1985); Piraino, supra note 64, at 689-91; Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Rea-
son and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1977).
66. BoNER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 15-18; Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and
Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity,
and Fairness, 61 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 981 (1986). The distinction between rule-of-reason
and dominance can be confusing. For example, the Mexican prohibitions against predation,
tying, horizontal restraints, and various vertical agreements can be interpreted as a rule-of-
reason approach if the final regulations cover both coordinated and unilateral activities. See
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policy has a narrower focus than the rule-of-reason approach in
that it only applies to large firms, but has a broader focus in that it
is easier to prove. Dominance is the standard for scrutinizing verti-
cal restraints in Argentina, monopolization in Ecuador, non-price
vertical restraints called tying, and price discrimination in
Venezuela.
Latin American countries have civil code judicial systems in
which the courts give more weight to written law and less weight to
historical (common) law. 7 This difference causes no problems for
per se regulations because courts need only decide if the action oc-
curred to determine its legality. On the other hand, dominance re-
quires the additional consideration of whether a dominant firm un-
dertook the activity and whether the activity had an adverse
effect.68 In a common law system, the courts would issue decisions
based on the interaction of the law and the related caselaw, and
these decisions would serve as dominance guidelines. However,
under the civil code, the law must be more specific."' Governments
must write regulations to identify when a firm has a dominant po-
sition. The court would then apply the regulations and reach a
judgment. For dominance situations, this would likely lead to
prohibitions on certain activity by firms that fit the definition of
dominance. Of course, rule-of-reason cases would become more
complex because they would require case-by-case balancing.
Initially, Latin American governments could define a set of ex-
clusionary practices, such as exclusive territories, exclusive dealing,
resale price maintenance, tied sales, refusal to deal, and agree-
ments not to compete. If a party undertakes any of these practices,
the court could review a checklist of conditions to determine
whether an antitrust violation had occurred.70
At a minimum, the checklist should include the following con-
ditions. First, the challenged practice must be applicable to a sub-
stantial part of the market. Thus, the firm or firms employing the
practice must have market power. Second, the potential for entry
into the market from either foreign or domestic sources must be
Mexican Competition Law, supra note 32, art. 13.
67. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985).
68. Fox, supra note 66, at 985-987.
69. MERRYMAN, supra note 67, at 26-33.
70. An example of such a list can be found in Easterbrook, supra note 43, at 19-39. As
Latin American countries write regulations, they will find such checklists useful.
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such that it cannot eliminate the threat to competition. Third, the
activity must relate to either the production or distribution of the
product in question. This requirement eliminates the need to con-
sider trivial restraints. Finally, in order to challenge a practice, one
must show that the practice either causes anticompetitive effects
or results in no increased efficiencies. If the first three factors are
satisfied and the firm could not show increased efficiencies, the
practice would be condemned. On the other hand, if the facts
showed that the practice increased efficiencies and lead to lower
consumer prices or higher quality, the challenger would need to
prove that the practice caused adverse effects on competition.
Though this final condition may be difficult to meet, applying the
checklist is probably no more difficult than the rule-of-reason ap-
proach, which admittedly is a significant hurdle to plaintiffs in
U.S. courts.
7 1
The table shows greater activity of nominal antitrust policy in
some countries than others.72 For example, Venezuela and Chile
have relatively well-developed antitrust laws, while most small
Latin American countries tend to ignore antitrust considerations.
In fact, the seven largest Latin American countries have significant
antitrust laws, while the remaining smaller countries do not. 3 Of
the relatively rich countries, only Uruguay and Costa Rica do not
have broad antitrust laws. In general, countries with fully-devel-
oped laws tend to apply rule-of-reason or dominance considera-
tions, while countries with a few or old proscriptions use per se
rules. Venezuela is the exception, as its law applies all three ap-
proaches. One can argue that all the antitrust policies allow for
exemptions, although the exemptions may prove as simple as deci-
sions not to prosecute.
71. Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982);
Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 381 (1980); Alan A. Fisher et al., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L.
REv. 777 (1989).
72. See Appendix A, infra.
73. Small countries usually have fewer national markets and can rely on international
competition to preserve a competitive market structure. Thus, active antitrust would be a
lesser priority in these countries.
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III. EVALUATION OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
A. Advocacy on Regulation
One of the most under-appreciated aspects of antitrust policy
is the antitrust agency's need to champion the free market system
within the government. Although the modern world requires some
regulations, governments should not expect to draft these regula-
tions without attracting the attention of special interest groups.
Special interest groups attempt to influence the regulation to ob-
tain advantages for their constituents, almost always at a cost to
society. This cost often involves regulations that deter or delay en-
try.74 Even well-intentioned regulatory processes may create gov-
ernment directives that block or delay entry into markets, thus un-
dermining the competitive market system.
Numerous government policies affect the ease of entry, some
in obvious ways and others more subtly. In his book The Other
Path, Hernando de Soto chronicled the steps necessary to open a
small business in Peru.75 He found it would take 289 days to open
a small six-person garment shop in the capital, Lima.76 Opening a
legitimate business would require the approval of the City Council,
Police Headquarters, the Peruvian Social Security Institute, and
the Ministries of Industry, Labor, the Economy, and Health.
Similarly, gaining government approval for a privately-operated
bus route would take twenty-seven months.78 De Soto's analysis re-
vealed that Peruvian state intervention in commercial activity
raises the costs of private suppliers by an average of 11.3% and
lowers profits by nearly three-fourths.
In addition to hurting small business, numerous government
regulations in Latin America restrict imports from entering na-
tional markets. These laws prevent both large multinationals and
export-oriented firms in neighboring countries from competing in
the market. Other regulations create barriers to entry by treating
existing market players more favorably than entrants.79
74. Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211
(1976); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22 (1971);
see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCL
3 (1971).
75. DE SoTo, THE OTHER PATH, supra note 7, at 131-188.
76. Id. at 134.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 146.
79. For example, the entire concept of government licensing determines who partici-
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Advocacy programs in the United States exist at both the An-
titrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission. Government economists and attorneys prepare
comments on proposed policies of other federal and state govern-
ment agencies. These comments bring the expertise of the staff,
acquired through years of work on competition matters, to bear on
regulatory questions of interest to other government agencies. This
competition advocacy ensures that the relevant decision makers
are exposed to the competitive consequences of their proposed
actions.
In any economy, the antitrust agency can act as a useful
watchdog to protect the market economy from excessive regula-
tion. In effect, the antitrust agency should attempt to regulate bu-
reaucracy and minimize the burden of government on society.
Competition advocacy educates the populace and exposes the hid-
den costs of regulation, such as non-tariff barriers to trade. The
antitrust agency can also foster growth by establishing free trade
associations in Latin America. 80 By ensuring that government reg-
ulations do not create unnecessary impediments to entry, advocacy
provides a useful complement to antitrust policy, especially in
those countries whose citizens do not truly understand the market
system.
B. Market Definition
Defining the market is a crucial step in antitrust enforcement.
pates in a market. While the safety of consumers requires some regulation in areas such as
the medical profession, it is difficult to argue that entry restrictions are necessary for the
800 different professions that currently require a license in at least one U.S. state. Countries
that desire quality assurance could simply certify producers who meet certain standards and
let the market decide if the additional qualifications are worth the cost. Absolute bans on
entry are not easily justified. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, THE COSTS AND BENEFrrs
OF OCCUPATIONA l REGULATION (Oct. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Bureau
of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission).
80. See Manfred Caspari, Competition and Regional Co-operation, COMPEITrION AND
ECON. DEv. June 6, 1991, at 75; Luis Jose Diez-Canseco Nuflez, Competition Law in the
Andean Pact, COMPETITION AND ECON. DaV., June 6, 1991, at 79; Luis Jos6 Diez-Canseco
Nufiez, Armonisaci6n de la legislaci6n sobre trafico econ6mico (April 8, 1987) (unpublished
manuscript, presented at the Seminario Subregional Legislaci6n de los Paises Miembros
del Acuerdo de Cartagena sobre Trdfico Econ6mico, Apr. 8-10, 1987 in Lima, Perfl, in asso-
ciation with La Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena) (on file with University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review); Felipe Salazar Santos, El Derecho del mercado en el grupo Andino
(Aug. 10, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Miami Inter-American
Law Review) (Dr. Felipe Salazar Santos is associated with La Junta del Acuerdo de
Cartagena).
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Although policies, such as advocacy against entry restrictions and
regulations against per se price fixing, can be implemented without
reference to a market, most policies require the definition of an
antitrust market.
Antitrust markets must be defined with respect to both con-
sumers (demand-side) and producers (supply-side). From a de-
mand perspective, the question concerns the magnitude of the cus-
tomer response to a price increase. If a sufficient number of
customers can shift to alternative products to prevent the product
in question from being priced independently, then that product
does not represent an antitrust market. In other words, the de-
mand side of the market encompasses the consumers' realistic al-
ternatives for the product in question. Theoretically, the elasticity
of demand-the ratio of the percentage change in quantity de-
manded to the percentage change in price-provides a measure of
these alternatives. The supply response is equally important. If
other firms can quickly and profitably convert sufficient capacity
to produce the good in question such that the product cannot be
priced independently of the alternative products, the good does
not represent an antitrust market. In general, the supply response
includes the viable reactions of new competitors striving to serve
consumers. The elasticity of the supply response equals the ratio of
the percentage change in quantity produced by other firms to the
percentage change in price of the product. A proposed market does
not represent a valid antitrust market unless firms have sufficient
flexibility to set price considering both demand and supply side
factors simultaneously.
Market definition has two dimensions-product and geo-
graphic. The product dimension reflects the characteristics of the
good in question. Variables include size, quality, function, and nu-
merous other basic aspects of the good. The product market defini-
tion identifies the characteristics of the products that comprise the
antitrust market and that are subject to a potential increase in
price. Once the product market is defined, one can examine the
geographic area where the product trades. While a product may be
sold in markets that range from the local area surrounding a town
(especially in the case of some services) to international arenas, the
geographic market includes only those areas where the seller can
successfully raise the product's price. Once the geographic market
is defined, one should check whether the competition from other
products and geographic areas is sufficient to prevent independent
[Vol. 24:1
ANTITRUST IN LATIN AMERICA
pricing; if so, one must consider a broader product market.
Actual evidence of past behavior represents the best data with
which to define a market. For example, if manufacturers have
shown flexibility to shift productive capacity between two products
in the past, a significant price increase will likely induce a large
shift. Thus, a narrow market cannot be substantiated. On the
other hand, if prices in one geographic region have maintained
themselves at a higher level than other areas following a market
shock (i.e. increase in demand), then a narrow geographic market
appears valid. If sufficient historical data exist, it should be possi-
ble to identify the relevant market. However, the data may not be
readily available.
Antitrust authorities in the United States have established a
hypothetical price test to structure the investigation when no
strong historical evidence is available. The approach breaks the
market definition process into two stages: demand side substitu-
tion and supply side substitution. As presented in the U.S. Merger
Guidelines, the approach asks if a firm (a hypothetical monopolist)
acting as the only present and future seller of the product in ques-
tion would find it profitable to impose a "small, but significant and
nontransitory" price increase.8' If the price increase proves profita-
ble, the potential market is acceptable from the demand side. If
the price increase proves unprofitable, the Guidelines suggest re-
peating the analysis with a broader proposed market. After the
identification of a proposed demand-side market, an evaluation of
supply side substitution occurs. The guidelines consider any firm
that could easily and economically manufacture and sell the prod-
uct in question within a short period of time to be in the market.82
81. The 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines defined "small, but significant
and nontransitory" as a five percent price increase lasting for one year. U.S. Department of
Justice & Federal Trade Commission 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984),
reprinted in 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1169 (Special Supp. June 14, 1984)
[hereinafter 1984 Guidelines]. The 1992 Guidelines keep the five percent test as a general
rule, but suggest the price increase should last for the indefinite future. See U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed.
Reg. 41,552, 41,555 (1992), reprinted in 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559
(Special Supp. April 2, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Guidelines].
82. The 1992 Guidelines are a little more specific and consider even an uncommitted
entrant to be a market participant if that firm can recover its sunk costs of entering the
market within one year. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 81, at 41,556-57. Sunk costs are invest-
ments in the industry that cannot be liquidated (sold) in the event of exit. Both the 1984
and 1992 Guidelines use a one year standard for market definition. 1984 Guidelines, supra
note 81; 1992 Guidelines, supra note 81.
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In order to define an antitrust market for analysis, one must apply
the Guidelines' approach to both the product and geographic mar-
ket question.
In practice, one must be careful in applying the hypothetical
approach to market definition. The most obvious pitfall involves
using a price test in differentiated product markets where .most
competition occurs on non-price dimensions.8 3 Although the ap-
proach is still valid, gathering relevant information is difficult be-
cause customers do not regularly make price-based comparisons.
Solutions involve generalizing the questions to focus on the non-
price aspects of competition or raising the significant price level.
A second problem involves structural conditions that preclude
substitution in the short-run. For example, many chemical manu-
facturing processes require costly qualifications for their inputs.
Once an input meets the requisite qualifications, manufacturers
are not likely to switch inputs until the next product reformula-
tion. The analyst can solicit more relevant information by asking
for the hypothetical response to a price' increase at the next
reformulation. "
A third problem involves the qualitative nature of the data on
product market substitution.5 Both demand and supply side anal-
yses require speculation on how consumers or producers might re-
spond to a price increase. However, it is difficult to suggest an al-
ternative technique if no historical data exists. At best, one can try
to quantify the performance differences between related products
and show how a five percent price change affects the dynamics of
product choice. To support a narrow market definition, the evi-
dence must show that a significant level of sales will not be lost to
other products in response to a price increase.8 6
A fourth and more elementary problem unique to developing
countries is that a significant part of the market may consist of the
so-called "informal sector. '8 7 Identifying market participants in
83. Although non-price considerations can be important in a geographic market analy-
sis, transportation costs tend to quantify most of the difference between locations.
84. The 1992 Guidelines attempt to address this problem by focusing on the response
to a price increase over an -indefinite future. As long as the indefinite future covers the
reformulation, no problem should exist. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 81, at 41,552.
85. For a geographic market analysis, the analyst can use the cost of transportation into
a region to determine if a small price increase makes distant sellers competitive.
86. John R. Morris & Gale R. Mosteller, Defining Markets for Merger Analysis, 36
ANTrrRUST BULL. 599 (1991).
87. See David L. Lindauer, Parallel, Fragmented, or Black? Defining Market Structure
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the informal sectors poses a significant problem for antitrust au-
thorities attempting to assess the competitive environment. How-
ever, the mere existence of an informal sector operating at the
margin of the law may suggest government imposed barriers to en-
try. In its general advocacy role, an antitrust authority can ad-
vance arguments facilitating the removal of these obstacles.
Although the administration of merger law actively employs
the Merger Guidelines, U.S. courts have used the guidelines less
actively.88 Numerous merger decisions are based on the demand
side market definition precedent in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,"' an approach that has stood the test of time."' The Guide-
lines have had a clear impact on supply side substitution, espe-
cially on geographic market definition where price data is generally
available.91 Thus, U.S. courts have accepted the hypothetical price
test when the evidence used to implement the hypothetical in-
volves more than informed speculation.2
in Developing Economies, 17 WORLD D.v. 1871 (1989); Christine Jones & Michael Roemer,
Editors' Introduction: Modeling and Measuring Parallel Markets in Developing Countries,
17 WORLD D-v. 1861 (1989); Victor E. Tokman, Policies for a Heterogeneous Informal Sec-
tor in Latin America, 17 WORLD D.v. 1067 (1989).
88. Malcolm B. Coate, Economics, the Guidelines and the Evolution of Merger Policy,
37 ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 1992).
89. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). According to Brown Shoe, the "outer boundaries [of a product
market] are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of
demand between the product itself and substitutes for it." Id. at 325.
90. The 1984 Merger Guidelines list the following considerations: The buyers' percep-
tion of whether the products are substitutes; differences or similarities in the price move-
ments of the products; similarities between the products with respect to customary use;
design or technical characteristics; and evidence on the sellers' perceptions of the degree of
competition between the products in question. 1984 Guidelines, supra note 81.
91. See United States v. Country Lake Food, Inc., [1990] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 69,113
(D. Minn. 1990) (court deemed evidence that large customers would switch to distant firms
for a five percent price increase to be sufficient for a larger market); see also FTC v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., [1986] 1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,071 (D.D.C. 1986) (court found
producers could switch between PVC homopolymer and PVC copolymer with a small
investment).
92. The district courts in United States v. Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J.
1985), FTC v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated, 850 F.2d 694
(D.C. Cir. 1988), and FTC v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., [1990] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
69,239 (D.D.C. 1990), rejected narrow markets based on the DOJ guidelines. In general, the
courts focused on evidence of market behavior and not responses to hypothetical questions.
In particular, the Calmar Court concluded that the anecdotal testimony concerning re-
sponses to price increases reflected customer inertia rather than any underlying business




Preserving competition among independent firms in the mar-
ketplace constitutes one of the most fundamental antitrust poli-
cies. Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, wrote: "People
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."93 Price fixing agree-
ments offer no benefits to society, and they distort the market by
shifting resources out of the victimized industry and into other less
productive areas. 4 Although history shows that price fixing agree-
ments have little stability, the social costs of the resulting higher
prices justify antitrust assaults on these agreements.
Price fixing agreements elevate and maintain price above the
competitive level.95 While collusive firms may increase prices with
little difficulty when the market structure permits, they face more
obstacles when the customer sets the prices. In such cases, the car-
tel must approach customers to ask for price increases and then
boycott uncooperative customers, thus forcing them to accept
higher prices. Maintaining price increases may be difficult when a
cartel member posts its prices because other members can offer se-
cret discounts and undercut the price agreement. To deter cheat-
ing on an agreement, collusive firms may allocate customers or geo-
graphic areas to particular firms. Alternatively, the cartel may
explicitly agree on a bid rotation or allocation scheme to ensure
that the price fixing agreement allows for a particular firm to ser-
vice each customer. Any of these actions would create a number of
monopoly situations and eliminate the ability of other firms to
secretly undercut the price. 6
The United States considers naked price fixing a per se viola-
tion of the law, regardless of the market power of the parties, the
93. SMITH, supra note 2, at 128.
94. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
95. For a discussion of price fixing in government procurement, see Malcolm B. Coate,
Techniques for Protecting Against Collusion in Sealed Bid Markets, 30 ANTITRUST BULL.
897 (1985). Latin American countries will have difficulty analyzing pricing patterns because
inflation tends to cover up collusive price increases. However, standard investigational tech-
niques, designed to ferret out agreements, are still useful.
96. Such cartels are more likely to be successful in markets where the industry is con-
centrated, the product is homogeneous, and the demand curve is inelastic. Stigler, supra
note 94.
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reasonableness of the price, or the effectiveness of the agreement.97
However, the definition of price fixing only includes agreements on
price, group boycotts over price, and agreements that divide mar-
kets.98 If horizontal competitors enter into non-price agreements to
enhance the performance of the market, 9 courts will scrutinize
these agreements under a relaxed standard.100 The U.S. approach
invites criticism because it apparently prefers categorization over
the analysis of behavior. In contrast, Canadian courts scrutinize all
horizontal agreements under a less stringent standard, allowing
price-fixing firms to escape liability when the agreements have no
effect in the market.101
Under the antitrust laws of the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), where price fixing is also illegal,102 prosecution pursu-
ant to article 85 of the Treaty of Rome only requires proof that
97. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59 (1940).
98. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222-23.
99. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
100. See infra part III.C.4.
101. This standard emerged from caselaw and turned on the analysis of two problems:
(1) the interpretation of the term "unduly;" and (2) the question of intent. In general, the
Canadian law on agreements "makes criminal offenses of agreements that 'prevent or
lessen,' or 'restrain or injure,' competition 'unduly.'" Thomas W. Ross, Proposals for a New
Canadian Competition Law on Conspiracy, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 851, 853 (1991). Ross
comments:
In his famous concurring opinion in [Howard Smith Paper Mills, Ltd. v. The
Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 426;] in 1957, Justice Cartwright offered his view (though it
was not an issue in that case) that a lessening of competition becomes undue
when the participants are "free to carry on those activities virtually unaffected
by the influence of competition." Cartwright's virtual elimination of competition
test is strict, and it was not completely accepted in subsequent decisions. How-
ever, it did have some impact as in [Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Queen, [1978] 1
S.C.R. 731,] in which the defendants were acquitted at least in part because
there were several competitors who had not joined the conspiracy.
Ross, supra, at 853-854. Ross further notes that in both Aetna and Atlantic Sugar Refin-
eries Co. v. Attorney General, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 644, the Court articulated a rule-of-reason
test for ascertaining whether actions by accused firms exhibited the essential elements of
"double intent":
[It must be proven both that the parties intended to enter into an agreement
and that they intended that the agreement lessen competition unduly. Given the
high standard in criminal cases proving this second element of intent presents
serious problems for enforcement. Recognizing this, the amendments of 1986
added subsection 2.2 which indicates that the Crown is not required to prove
intent to lessen competition.
Ross, supra, at 854. Note, however, that recently the constitutional validity of these provi-
sions has been successfully challenged.
102. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, art. 85, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 47-48 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
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suppliers have agreed to fix prices, although firms may apply for
exemptions.' In contrast, Spain, Sweden, and the United King-
dom have laws that scrutinize horizontal price fixing under a rule-
of-reason standard.
1 04
In Latin America, price fixing should be an enforcement prior-
ity. If the new competitive environment squeezes profit margins,
firms may enter collusive pricing agreements, rather than use inno-
vations to reduce costs. Thus, to deter price fixing, courts should
follow a per se analysis instead of a rule-of-reason approach be-
cause the per se standard increases certainty and economizes en-
forcement resources. Enforcement should focus on obtaining evi-
dence of agreements to set prices, boycott customers, or allocate
business to specific suppliers. Public education may aid in enforce-
ment by informing citizens of how the market should work.'0 5 Fur-
thermore, disgruntled employees and rivals may provide useful in-
formation. The enforcement agency can monitor markets by
looking for irregularities in price movements or sales patterns that
are incompatible with competition. In setting penalties, govern-
ments may want to consider a transition period for businesses to
adapt to the new environment in those industries where govern-
ment price fixing has been a way of life.' 0°
2. Monopolization by Predation
In addition to taking action against price fixing, antitrust pol-
icy should prevent a single firm from obtaining or enhancing mo-
nopoly power. When implementing this policy, however, one must
distinguish between cases where the firm obtains a monopoly
through superior efficiency and cases where the firm abuses the
competitive process (predates) and makes it impossible for rivals
to engage in competition. Predation is defined as:
a firm's deliberate aggression against one or more rivals through
the employment of business practices that would not be consid-
103. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 37; VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE TO EEC COMPETIoN LAW AND PRACTICE 119 (4th ed. 1990). Governments, however,
rarely grant exemptions for price fixing agreements.
104. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 51.
105. In Venezuela, the antitrust agency published a pamphlet designed to introduce the
agency and its mission. PRO COMPETENCIA: SUPERINTENDENCIA PARA LA PROMOcI6N v PROTEC-
CION DE LA LIaRE CoMPETrNCIA (1992).
106. Note that policies to promote entry would undermine cartel pricing because en-
trants would not necessarily abide by collusive agreements.
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ered profit maximizing except for the expectation either that (1)
rivals will be driven from the market, leaving the predator with
a market power sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2)
rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive be-
havior the predator finds inconvenient or threatening.
0 7
Predation impairs consumer welfare because it can lead to monop-
olistic behavior.
Examples of predation include: predatory pricing; non-price
predation; and misuse of government processes. Predatory pricing
occurs when a firm sells below cost to drive rivals out of the mar-
ket with the expectation of later raising prices to monopoly
levels.10 8 Price predation only produces profits if rivals do not re-
enter the market. Thus, for predation to provide a viable option,
some form of entry barrier must exist to ensure that rivals do not
quickly reappear.
Predation may also involve non-price means, such as innova-
tion and promotion. Although non-price predation may be cheaper
than price predation, no simple cost rule differentiates predation
from competition. Again, the cost of predation must be recouped
for the strategy to be profitable. 0 9
Misuse of a government process is another example of preda-
tion. Since the predator will probably incur very low costs, an
abuse of the courts or other governmental agencies constitutes an
effective means of slowing or quelling competition. 1 0 For example,
an incumbent monopolist, fearing potential loss of business, may
intervene before a regulatory authority or file a lawsuit to delay a
new entrant. This activity may be profitable if the incumbent can
preserve its market position for an extended period of time.
In the United States, courts look at two necessary conditions
107. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 144.
108. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 43, at 184.
109. Another form of non-price predation, "raising rivals' costs," involves a predator
who undertakes actions to directly raise its competitors' costs and hence, the market price.
The predator need not drive the rival from the market. Although it is impossible to prove
that predation cannot occur, a complete analysis shows that due to the significant costs,
such predation is quite rare. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anti-com-
petitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209
(1986) (describing in detail the concept of raising rivals' costs); see also Timothy J. Bren-
nan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs", 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 95 (1988) (discussing the
limitations of the concept of raising rivals' costs); Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit,
Exclusion, Collusion and Confusion?: The Underpinnings of Raising Rivals' Costs, 16 REs.
IN LAW & EcON. (forthcoming 1993).
110. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 159.
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for predation: (1) investment in securing a monopoly position; and
(2) recoupment of the costs of this investment. For price predation,
the evidence must show that the firm sells at a price below average
variable cost."' Although more complex, predation can be unprof-
itable if the market remains competitive."" Once predatory con-
duct is identified, the evidence must show also that the costs can
be recouped."' When the alleged predatory investment cannot be
recouped, the inference is that the market is competitive."" Fi-
nally, to a certain extent one can use evidence of intent to supple-
ment evidence of recoupment."5
The EEC antitrust laws view predation as an abuse of a domi-
nant position."" Since a predation case in Europe may require
much less evidence than that required in the United States, some
criticize the European policy as protecting competitors, rather
than competition. 1 7 For example, the EEC Court of Justice found
a company guilty of abusing its dominant market position after it
lowered its prices with the intent to eliminate a competitor." 8
When a company lowers its prices below total cost with the intent
to disadvantage a competitor, a court may deem the action illegal
even if the price is above average costs. Other cases have suggested
that the predator has a duty to deal with its vertically related com-
111. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432
(7th Cir. 1980).
112. For example, in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), a news-
paper refused to do business with firms that advertised on a new radio station. Id. at 148.
The newspaper would not recoup the loss of revenue unless its activities were successful in
eliminating the radio station as a competitor. See id. at 153; BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX,
supra note 43, at 344-45.
113. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1985). The U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that "the success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining mo-
nopoly power for long enough to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional
gain." Id. at 589.
114. Price can easily fall below cost if a small firm is investing to build market share, or
a firm fails in the marketplace and manages an orderly exit.
115. One should not, however, use evidence of intent as a substitute for evidence of
recoupment. Judge Easterbrook opined that antitrust inquiry as to the intent of the parties
is not justified unless recoupment is likely. He further noted that "[o]nly if the market
structure makes recoupment feasible need a court inquire into the relation between price
and cost." A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acres Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir.
1989).
116. Treaty of Rome, supra note 102, art. 86 (dealing with abuse of a dominant position
and predation).
117. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 62-63.
118. Case 62/86, AKZO Chemie BV & Anor v. Commission, [1991 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 686 (1991).
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petitors, even if they attempt to enter its market." 9 By refusing to
sell, the predator could defeat the attempt at entry. However, the
dominance concept does not always require evidence showing that
the predator exercised market power and recouped its investment
in predation.120
An active predation policy must carefully focus only on exclu-
sionary tactics of would-be monopolists, rather than on the inter-
actions associated with robust competition. This focus has particu-
lar importance in Latin America, where small firms may accuse
their large rivals of predation when the large firms introduce new
competitive tactics in response to shifts in the market economy.1
21
Given the unilateral nature of monopolization, distinguishing these
predatory strategies from active competition is difficult. Legitimate
aggressive long-term investment at the expense of short-term gains
may lead ultimately to greater efficiencies and thus, the demise of
competitors. Such strategies are predatory only when their sole ec-
onomic justification depends on the returns from the subsequent
elimination of competitors. Antitrust policy should screen cases to
eliminate those where predation cannot explain the market behav-
ior. "'2 2 For example, the antitrust policy can insist (1) that the al-
leged predatory firm have a large share (i.e. over fifty percent); (2)
that the one who alleges predation demonstrate an expenditure of
resources by the alleged predator;'2 3 (3) that barriers to entry ei-
ther exist or will be created by the alleged predation; and (4) that
the alleged predatory practice adversely affects most of the small
firms in the market. Even if the alleged predation passes all four
119. See Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under article 86 of the EEC
Treaty (IV/32.279-BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: Interim measures) 1987 O.J. (L 286) 36 [hereinaf-
ter BBI/Boosey]; Joined cases 6/73 & 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R.
223, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11 8209 (1974); British Sugar, 1988
O.J. (L 284) 41. These cases generally prohibit predatory actions to maintain dominance in a
vertically related market when competitors threaten to enter.
120. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 65.
121. See generally Diez-Canseco Nuilez, supra note 80, at 84-85.
122. For a more general approach, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and
Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 263 (1981) (considering the nature and potential for
success of various predatory strategies and concluding that each strategy, although superfi-
cially possible, is unlikely to be profitable given the risks faced by the predator and the
responses available to rivals); see also Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework
for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979) (presenting a list of condi-
tions that should be met in a predation case).
123. For example, courts would not consider the dominant firm's pricing predatory if it




tests, a rule-of-reason analysis would be necessary to determine
whether future anti-competitive effects outweigh the efficiency
benefits.
3. Merger Analysis
Thus far, antitrust enforcement appears designed to prevent
firms from explicitly coordinating their actions to proxy a monopo-
list and to defeat any unilateral attempts to monopolize a market.
Antitrust policy should also prevent firms from undertaking hori-
zontal mergers likely to generate similar anti-competitive effects.
Merger enforcement proceeds along two tracks: monopoly and
oligopoly. An anti-monopoly policy prevents a firm from obtaining
a monopoly or dominant position by acquiring its rivals in markets
protected by barriers to entry. Two types of entry barriers arise in
most analyses. Under the first, entrants bear a cost not borne by
existing competitors.12 4 These barriers allow incumbents to main-
tain prices above the competitive level for the indefinite future and
are often traceable to some governmental policy. The second type
of entry barrier considers the time required for profitable entry.25
If entry takes such a long time that incumbents could profitably
raise prices in the short run and tolerate entry in the long run,
then a competitive market structure is necessary to preserve com-
petition. The U.S. Merger Guidelines suggest a two-year standard
for entry."'6 Thus, if entry could profitably deter or defeat an anti-
competitive price increase within two years, challenging a merger is
not warranted.
Under the more complicated oligopoly enforcement track, the
government pursues a policy to prevent firms from obtaining mar-
ket shares sufficient to tacitly collude and price above the competi-
tive level. There is no agreed upon standard for what constitutes
tacit collusion. Oligopoly policy, like monopoly policy, focuses on
entry conditions because neither oligopolists nor monopolists can
set prices above the competitive level in the absence of entry barri-
ers. Robert Bork, the most noted antitrust expert of a generation,
124. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 43, at 310-11.
125. Id. at 310-11, 314-15.
126. The 1992 Merger Guidelines describe a three-part test: timeliness; likelihood; and
sufficiency for entry. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 81, at S-12. To deter or defeat an
anti-competitive price increase, entry must (1) affect competition within two years, (2) have
sales opportunities for the entrant greater than the minimum viable scale of entry, and (3)
have sufficient magnitude to address the anti-competitive effect of concern. Id.
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suggested a policy that would allow a firm to acquire a forty per-
cent share through a merger, as long as such a share allowed for
two other large competitors. 127 Alternatively, one could express
Bork's rule as "three is enough" for competition (this translates
into a post-merger Herfindahl index of 3333.)118 Of course, if struc-
tural conditions made tacit collusion a feasible option with more
than three firms, other mergers could be challenged.
Efficiencies represent the key remaining issue. By combining
the resources of two firms, horizontal mergers permit the joint firm
to produce more output with any given input level. Examples of
efficiencies include lower transportation costs, economies of scale,
and overhead cost savings. One must balance these efficiencies
against anti-competitive effects to achieve the optimal enforcement
policy. One commentator observed that even small efficiency gains
can outweigh the deadweight loss associated with large monopoly
price increases. 2 9 Analysts have criticized this approach for ignor-
ing the higher prices paid by consumers. If monopolists invest re-
sources to raise prices, society may lose the total value of the mo-
nopoly.1 80 A policy that considers the price effects of mergers
would require large efficiencies to offset monopoly pricing. A third
approach would incorporate the likelihood of both efficiencies and
anti-competitive effects in the analysis. Thus, likely efficiencies
could outweigh relatively unlikely anti-competitive effects. A more
specialized approach to efficiencies rests in a failing firm policy.3 1
If a merger partner can save a business that would otherwise exit
the market, the implicit reduction in costs would benefit society.
127. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 221-22. Bork would allow mergers
that result in a firm with a sixty to seventy percent share of the market. Id. at 221. Bork
also noted that barriers to entry must exist before warranting merger enforcement. Id. at
195.
128. The Herfindahl index equals the sum of the squares of the market shares (usually
defined as percentages) held by the existing participants in a market. It is a measure of
market structure with a range from almost zero for a perfectly competitive market to 10,000
for a monopoly. See RESOURCE ECONOMICS: SELECTED WORKS OF ORRIS C. HERFINDAHL
(David S. Brooks, ed., 1974). In the example in the text, a merger that reduced the number
of firms in the industry to three (each with a market share of 33.33 percent) would generate
a post-acquisition Herfindahl of 3333.
129. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 AM. ECON. REv. 18 (1968).
130. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL.
EcoN. 807 (1975).
131. See John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, Efficiencies, Failing
Firms, and Alternatives to Merger: A Policy Synthesis, 31 ANTrrRusT BULL. 431, 444-450
(1986).
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Merger policy in the United States attacks transactions in
highly concentrated industries when barriers to entry exist.132 Al-
most all of the mergers enjoined since 1982 have had Herfindahl
statistics over 1800, with most being over 2400.8' This represents a
dramatic relaxation of the standards from the 1960s, under which
all mergers in oligopolistic industries were considered illegal (even
when Herfindahls were below 1000). Structural and performance
evidence is also considered in deciding whether to block a merger
when the anti-competitive effect would require the cooperation of
the remaining players. While the FTC does not allow efficiencies to
offset anti-competitive effects in any systematic manner," 4 courts
tend to be slightly more sympathetic.188
Europe has a more relaxed merger policy, than the United
States, with EEC policy focusing primarily on transactions that
would create or enhance a dominant firm."8 ' Only Germany has an
active oligopoly merger control policy.1 37 German merger investiga-
tions respond to the absolute size of the parties, sometimes prohib-
iting mergers where one of the parties is large, even though that
132. United States v. Waste Management, Inc. 588 F. Supp. 498 (1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d
976 (1984) (presenting a clear analysis of why countries require that a market have barriers
to entry before deeming a merger to have an anti-competitive effect). In United States v.
Syufy Enterprises, 712 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990),
the court concluded that a merger would not be anti-competitive, even if the transaction
created a monopoly, unless barriers prevented new firms from quickly entering the market.
133. Coate, Economies, supra note 88. The court in United States v. Baker Hughes,
Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990), discusses the classic
three-prong test for merger analysis, as established in United States v. Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). The government (or plaintiff) must prove a concentrated
market to create a presumption that the merger in question will create an anti-competitive
effect. The defendant then has the burden to show that the merger will probably not be
anti-competitive. While evidence on ease of entry may prove particularly probative, analysis
of other points such as ease of collusion and efficiencies is also relevant. The plaintiff, how-
ever, retains the overall burden of proof on the merits. Thus, concentration numbers re-
presefit only the first stage of the merger analysis. Coate, Economies, supra note 88.
134. Malcolm B. Coate & Fred S. McChesney, Empirical Evidence on FTC Enforce-
ment of the Merger Guidelines, 30 EcoN. INQUIRY 277, 284 (1992).
135. Coate, Economies, supra note 88.
136. EEC Merger Control Regulation 4064/89, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter EEC
Regulation 4064]. This regulation establishes a pre-merger notification system for large
transactions and charges the Commission with the responsibility of evaluating mergers
under article 86.
137. BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 28-30. This conclusion may change as a re-
sult of the EEC's acceptance of a consent agreement involving an oligopolistic dominance
problem with bottled water sold in France. See Commission Closes Inquiry into Merger
Between NestlI and Perrier (July 22, 1992) (unpublished Commission agreement, on file
with author). In the absence of this settlement, two firms would have dominated the market.
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firm may not have had a large market share.13 8 In this sense, the
dominance concept supports more frequent intervention against
horizontal mergers than the market power concept. On the other
hand, dominance only creates a rebuttable presumption of a viola-
tion.189 In reality, German officials often reject the dominance hy-
pothesis, generating much weaker policy than the U.S. focus on oli-
gopoly.140 German merger control rarely features a balancing of
efficiencies against the anti-competitive effects."" However, nu-
merous other countries such as France, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom employ a merger policy motivated by public interest
standards that could include efficiencies. The EEC policy also calls
for some consideration of efficiencies.
1 4 2
In Latin America, merger enforcement policy should make al-
lowances for scale and other efficiencies. "1 3 As the economies reor-
ganize after years of state oversight, the current market structure
will likely prove inefficient and firms will want to merge to better
compete under the new market conditions. In general, an enforce-
ment focus on mergers that result in monopoly will permit firms to
capture efficiencies. Even a monopoly-based merger policy would
require barriers to entry for the merger to be of concern. Efficiency
could outweigh the anti-competitive effects in industries with po-
tential for international competition, while local markets could use
a tighter anti-monopoly policy. By basing the policy choice on the
type of problem, the government can minimize the enforcement
138. Courts presume dominance where the merging parties have sales of at least DM12
billion. See BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 78.
139. Id. at 77. Dominance may not be found if other large competitors exist. Id.
140. Id. at 78.
141. Id.
142. See EEC Regulation 4064, supra note 136. In particular, article 2.3 defines the
conditions under which a merger may be allowed, and article 21.3 empoWers individual
states to exempt certain transactions.
143. Joint ventures represent an antitrust concern for merger policy. If the joint ven-
ture results in a pooling of the total business assets within a relevant market, a court should
deem the venture to be a merger. On the other hand, if the venture only represents an
agreement between the firms to pool some assets, then the courts should consider that the
two companies retain substantial independence. For example, the General Motors (G.M.)-
Toyota joint venture in the United States added an automobile plant to the U.S. economy,
but both G.M. and Toyota remained independent.
Output expansions are rarely, if ever, anti-competitive, and thus, policy should en-
courage them. Moreover, research and development joint ventures tend to be more efficient
because they expand future output, without much risk to competition. In general, joint ven-
tures between foreign and domestic firms to develop products for Latin American markets




4. Non-Price Horizontal Restraints
Non-price horizontal restraints consist of agreements between
direct competitors that limit a form of competitive behavior other
than price. Some agreements, such as naked customer boycotts
that focus on price, are subject to being condemned as a form of
price fixing. Governments can evaluate the competitive effects of
other horizontal restraints with the rule-of-reason standard, which
balances the potential efficiencies and anti-competitive impacts of
the policy in question.
Horizontal agreements are generally ancillary to some coopera-
tive venture. If manufacturers are not likely to make a product
without a horizontal agreement, the rule-of-reason standard gener-
ally permits the agreement to ensure that society obtains the bene-
fit of the product. For example, music licensing law requires firms,
such as nightclubs and radio stations, to obtain a license to play
copyrighted music." 5 If these firms had to deal individually with
the composers, transactions costs could prevent the general use of
many types of music. However, if composers combine to issue blan-
ket licenses, each user would have access to all the musical compo-
sitions. In effect, the joint licensing (a horizontal agreement) adds
to consumer choice and can be considered pro-competitive.
In other markets, no clear line exists. A group of manufactur-
ers may want to offer a high quality product and agree on a set of
restrictions that maintain quality. Alternatively, a group of firms
may set up a cooperative to purchase feedstocks at lower prices
and agree on a set of restrictions to ensure that all members par-
ticipate in the program."" In either case, the restrictions may limit
competition, but a rule-of-reason analysis would balance the effi-
144. As in the United States and the European Community (EC), antitrust authorities
in Latin America might establish a pre-merger screening system for large acquisitions to
avoid the problems associated with disentangling consummated transactions. In addition,
screening ensures cooperation because the merger is not permitted until the end of the re-
view. However, the costs associated with the screening process may hamper efficient transac-
tions. Thus, subject to the need for information, a government should design its screening
programs to minimize the costs imposed on transactions.
145. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
146. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284 (1985) (finding that a cooperative could expel a member without committing a per
se antitrust offense, as long as it did not have market power or exclusive access essential to
an element of competition).
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ciency and anti-competitive effects. For example, a trade associa-
tion may make rules that set minimum quality standards or limit
advertising. A rule-of-reason analysis would initially search for
anti-competitive effects or, in the absence of such effects, market
power. The activity does not require enforcement action if the
agreement does not injure competition or create market power. On
the other hand, if the agreement produces either an adverse effect
or market power, one must balance the anti-competitive effect with
the efficiency benefits.
A third type of horizontal agreement involves an upstream or
downstream boycott designed to disadvantage a horizontal compet-
itor. Again, the analysis depends on whether the net impact of the
agreement is pro-competitive or anti-competitive. For example, a
group of retailers may jointly threaten a manufacturer to stop car-
rying its product if the manufacturer continues to sell through a
rival distribution channel. If the retailers, acting together, can ex-
clude the rival and if transaction costs slow entry to the point
where exclusion results in higher (quality adjusted) consumer
prices, a violation would exist as long as efficiencies did not offset
the anti-competitive effect. On the other hand, if the retailers lack
market power, they are unlikely to affect price.
Policy in the United States is shifting from a per se standard,
which makes all horizontal agreements illegal, to a rule-of-reason
standard. 4 7 One could argue that U.S. courts adhere to a trun-
cated rule-of-reason policy, with horizontal agreements condemned
in the absence of a clear efficiency. 1 4 The complete transformation
to a pure rule-of-reason standard awaits Supreme Court action to
apply its rule-of-reason vertical antitrust approach to the horizon-
tal area.14 1 Under such a standard, horizontal restraint investiga-
tions would focus on either effects or market power and the result-
ing efficiencies. If one can show a direct anti-competitive effect,
then one can object to the agreement provided no significant effi-
ciencies exist. 150 However, in most cases, one must infer the anti-
147. Compare NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (where the Court, after
searching for an efficiency justification, found restrictions on television contracts to be ille-
gal) with National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (where
the Court held that a trade association regulation against price competition was per se
illegal).
148. See FTC v. Massachusetts Bd. of Registration, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988).
149. See Northwest Wholesale v. Pacific, 472 U.S. at 284 (Supreme Court almost en-
dorsed a rule-of-reason standard for all ancillary restraints in horizontal cases).
150. For example, if a local group of retailers agreed to open their shops only from 10
1992]
74 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1
competitive effect from market power and balance it against
efficiencies.
15
The EEC enforces horizontal relationships through article 85,
although the existence of exemptions suggests that the actual pol-
icy sometimes follows a rule-of-reason analysis.15 The dominance
concept also provides an enforcement mechanism for agreements
that implicitly create or strengthen a large supplier while dis-
advantaging smaller rivals.153 Thus, European policy may require a
showing of market share, but once that share is obtained, finding a
violation for horizontal activity that injures small rivals is likely.
Latin America should not make non-price horizontal restraints
an enforcement priority for several reasons.154 First, an active pol-
icy will create minimal benefits in comparison to the returns from
a direct attack on price fixing. Second, the need to conduct rule-of-
reason analyses to show that anti-competitive effects outweigh the
efficiency benefits will make the costs associated with an active en-
forcement policy high. Finally, the pro-competitive effect of entry
may offset any anti-competitive effects before government action
can impact the market. Thus, the optimal policy would limit the
number of horizontal restraint cases.
a.m. to 2 p.m., and if the prices for their products rose, one would balance this anti-competi-
tive effect against any efficiencies to determine the legality of the agreement.
151. See John E. Lopatka, Antitrust and Professional Rules: A Framework for Analy-
sis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 301 (1991).
152. Treaty of Rome, supra note 102, art. 85. See KORAH, supra note 103, at 120 (not-
ing that the EEC uses exemptions in a number of situations where U.S. courts would not
find liability).
153. Treaty of Rome, supra note 102, art. 86. See Commission Decision relating to a
proceeding under articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.979 and 31.394, Decca Navi-
gator System) 1989 O.J. (L 43) 27. The Commission found illegal an agreement between
Decca and its small horizontal competitors which allocated the commercial navigation cus-
tomers to Decca, while allowing the non-commercial navigation customers to buy systems
from small firms. Decca argued that it needed to earn revenue from the commercial ac-
counts to pay for the radio system that both Decca and its rivals used. This decision appears
to protect small competitors, at a risk to the overall level of competition.
154. Technology licensing represents a type of non-price horizontal agreement that
does not justify enforcement actions under most circumstances. The innovating company
(often foreign) may find it more efficient and profitable to license its technology to a domes-
tic company. Although one could argue that the license is an agreement, it actually repre-
sents only one step in the exploitation of the patent or trade secret. Regulations against
exclusive license agreements could force the innovating firm to enter the market itself (in a
slower and less efficient manner) or forego participation in the local market entirely. Overac-
tive enforcement would injure domestic consumers. Of course, in some cases, the innovating
firm would prefer to enter directly or form a joint venture with a local firm. Thus, policies
that require licensing can also be inefficient.
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5. Vertical Restraints
Manufacturers use vertical restraints to control the down-
stream behavior of their distributors. Transaction costs generally
preclude a manufacturer from integrating into the retail sector.
Therefore, a manufacturer must deal with independent distribu-
tors and retailers to sell its product. 5 ' Unless restrained, distribu-
tors or retailers may take action that adversely affects the manu-
facturer's attempt to maximize profits. Distributors and retailers
may behave opportunistically, considering only short-run profit.
Manufacturers often impose vertical restrictions to preclude, or at
least reduce, such opportunism.
Vertical restrictions may include either price or non-price re-
strictions. Resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements restrict
the retailer from selling a manufacturer's product below a specified
price. Such agreements ensure that the retailer provides the neces-
sary service on a product because the manufacturer can terminate
any retailer that fails to perform. By guaranteeing the retailer a
fixed margin on the sale of a product, the manufacturer creates a
quasi-rent that the retailer loses if he behaves opportunistically. 156
Non-price restraints limit intra-brand competition by restrict-
ing the territory or the customers available to a retailer.1 7 Thus,
the retailer is less likely to behave opportunistically and undercut
the manufacturer's suggested prices. In effect, non-price restraints
function in much the same way as price restraints.
In rare cases, vertical restraints may be anti-competitive. For
example, a cartel may institute resale price maintenance to ensure
155. In any market economy, the act of trading in a market requires the parties to incur
transaction costs. For example, consumers incur search costs when gathering information
about the quality and prices of products available in the market. Retailers incur costs when
financing transactions. In many market economies, manufacturers have found it more effi-
cient to avoid the business of distribution by selling to the retail sector. Specialist retailers
can reduce transaction costs by achieving economies of scale and investing in specialized
knowledge.
156. Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforce-
ment Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1988). For example, opportunism would include the
failure to provide pre- or post-sale service.
157. Vertical restraints also include exclusive distribution, where a manufacturer insists
that a retailer not carry products of the competitors. In theory, such a restraint prevents the
retailer from opportunistically using the product of one manufacturer to draw in customers
and then selling the product of another manufacturer that carries a higher retail margin.
This practice cannot be anti-competitive as long as either a number of unconstrained retail-
ers exists or there is ease of entry into retailing.
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that retailers do not cause deviations from the collusive prices. To
be effective, the RPM agreement requires participation by most of
the cartel members. A retailer cartel could also force a manufac-
turer to institute RPM to preserve a collusive price agreement on
margins. However, in both cases, since the RPM acts as a symptom
of a horizontal problem, governments could take enforcement ac-
tion against the horizontal agreement.
Though current U.S. law makes resale price maintenance per
se illegal, the U.S. Supreme Court interprets vertical price agree-
ment so narrowly that the manufacturer must practically enter
into written contracts with retailers before the manufacturer would
violate the law. 158 Courts in the United States currently scrutinize
restrictions under a rule-of-reason standard.1 59 A recent review of
federal appellate decisions reveals that the courts almost always
uphold non-price restraints.110 Thus, when a court applies the rule-
of-reason approach, the action is almost always found to be legal.
In general, the EEC condemns vertical restraints under article
85 of the Treaty of Rome as agreements among competitors. 6'
Vertical restraints also cause concern in the European antitrust
tradition when employed by a dominant firm (with dominance de-
fined at relatively low share levels). For example, a number of
cases involve a duty to deal with a vertically related firm. '62 In the-
ory, dominant firms have the same efficiency incentives to use ver-
tical restraints as other firms, but the anti-competitive hypotheses
do not apply if the dominant firm has unilateral market power. At
best, the restrictions on vertical restraints facilitate entry by hand-
icapping the dominant firm. Consumers do not benefit from a pol-
icy that disadvantages large firms, forces up price, and induces en-
158. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
159. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
160. See Douglas H. Ginsberg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule
of Reason, 60 ANTrRUST L.J. 67, 70-73 (1991).
161. Treaty of Rome, supra note 102, art. 85; see also KORAH, supra note 103, at 122.
Korah notes that while article 85(3) exempts exclusivity and some territorial vertical re-
straints, the EEC does a poor job of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical re-
straints. Id. This suggests that vertical price restraints are especially unlikely to be ex-
empted. See id. at 146.
162. For example, in Case 22/78, Hugin v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8524 (1979), the court found that a firm in a
dominant position with regard to spare parts for its own equipment was likely to have a
duty to deal. The court ordered no action because the effects remained limited to one coun-
try. Id. In a number of other cases, the court ordered a firm to deal with or continue to deal
with a vertically related entrant. See BBI/Boosey, supra note 119.
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try by small, inefficient rivals. Thus, dominance should not be used
as a basis for antitrust policy in Latin America.63
In conclusion, an optimal antitrust policy that considers en-
forcement costs and chilling effects would not focus its enforce-
ment on vertical restrictions.' 6 ' Such a policy could be particularly
important for rapidly developing Latin American economies be-
cause many firms are relatively new and do not have business rep-
utations. Since manufacturers cannot rely on the reputation and
careful selection of retailers to ensure an optimal distribution sys-
tem, they may need to use vertical agreements to control the ac-
tions of their downstream distributors.165 Even a vertical restraint
policy limited to dominant firms raises doubts. As many dominant
manufacturers have recently undergone privatization or remain
unprotected enterprises, hampering these manufacturers in com-
peting against small, efficiently configured entrants and importers
through a ban on vertical restraints is unreasonable. Of course, the
government may still take action against vertical restraints if the
evidence shows the restraints played a role in price-fixing, but such
enforcement would involve a horizontal, rather than vertical, case.
6. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination consists of unilateral policies by firms to
sell products to different customers at different quality-adjusted
prices.' Firms impose these policies to increase profitability by
allowing the firm to sell to marginal customers without discounting
163. Some dominance cases involve exclusive dealing where manufacturers force the
distributors not to deal with entrants. Some courts are more concerned with the predatory,
rather than vertical, aspects of an agreement. See, e.g., Commission Decision relating to a
proceeding under article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.900, BPB Industries plc.), 1989 O.J.
(L. 10) 50 (holding that British Gypsum's distribution policies tended to force an exclusive
distribution system and preclude entry into the market it dominated).
164. While they can be vertical in nature, franchising agreements do not raise antitrust
concerns due to the efficiencies associated with franchising. The franchise system imposes a
set of restraints that all franchisees agree to follow to assure consumers that the products
offered by one franchisee are basically the same as the products offered by another. Thus,
one can obtain many of the efficiencies of a large firm, without incurring the costs associated
with managing a large business.
165. Vertical integration provides an alternative to vertical restraints. Assuming the
large firms would choose a distribution system with vertical restraints, an active enforce-
ment policy could force manufacturers to rely on less efficient integrated systems. Since
vertical integration requires higher capital expenditures, a tough vertical policy could slow
industrial growth.
166. An example of an extreme form of price discrimination is the refusal to deal at any
price. Such behavior could be a form of predation.
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to the firm's core customers. However, if the firm has sufficient
market power, price discrimination may deter entry by offering
discounts to customers likely to switch to an entrant.
Price discrimination may involve firms offering discounts to
specific customers. These discounts may pass on efficiencies to cus-
tomers, initiate competition, or meet competition. Alternatively, a
firm may offer discounts to customers who threaten to deal with
entrants. If the discounts deter entry, an incumbent with market
power can earn monopoly profits from the customers who lack al-
ternatives. In theory, requiring a single price will broaden the ben-
efits of potential entry to the entire market. 1 7 Note, this theory
only applies to monopolistic or dominant firms facing a threat
from entry.
Tying, defined as a monopolistic conditioning of the sale of
product A on the purchase of product B, exemplifies a sophisti-
cated form of price discrimination. At first glance, tying appears to
allow the monopolist to increase his revenues by forcing the con-
sumer to pay supra-competitive prices for product B; however,
such a pricing policy only reduces the price the consumer is willing
to pay for product A. In fact, tying may act as a metering scheme
to allow a manufacturer to price discriminate among its customers.
The manufacturer discounts the price of product A below the mo-
nopoly level, but requires consumers that use product A intensely
to purchase large amounts of the complementary input B and pay
relatively high net prices. Consumers that do not use product A in
such a manner may purchase small amounts of product B and pay
relatively low net prices. This approach to pricing, viewed as pro-
competitive, generally increases output as more consumers buy the
"low-priced" product A. Alternatively, tying schemes may allow
the manufacturer to economize on transaction costs.
In the United States, some forms of price discrimination are
per se illegal, although limitations restrict the breadth of this pro-
hibition. The Robinson-Patman Act covers systematic price dis-
crimination schemes that affect the price of a good (not a service)
and injure rival competitors ineligible for the discount.1 Occa-
sional promotional pricing is not proscribed. Though firms can es-
cape liability when the discounts are necessary to meet competi-
167. Active enforcement of regulations against price discrimination, like an active pol-
icy against predation, runs the risk of suppressing competition, rather than monopolization.
168. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988); see BORK, AN-
TITUST PARADOX, supra note 43, at 382-401.
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tion or create efficiencies, courts narrowly construe these two
defenses. Courts often infer competitive injury from systematic
price discrimination,' 6 although one may now present evidence
that breaks the link between price differentials and lost profits to
rebut the presumption of competitive injury. 70 Overall, U.S. laws
tend to protect downstream competitors by ensuring their long-
term equal footing. Though per se illegal, tying restrictions apply
only to firms with market power and then only when the tie has an
adverse impact on competition.1 7 1 Hence, most firms may legally
use tying schemes.
European antitrust policy considers price discrimination and
tying per se illegal when employed by dominant firms.12 Schemes
that base price discrimination on the national boundaries within
the EEC raise a particular concern. 73 Discrimination that is neces-
sary to meet competition from other suppliers appears legal. Na-
tional laws also cover price discrimination and tying. For example,
Germany generally evaluates tying under the rule-of-reason ap-
proach, but applies a per se standard to dominant firms. '
7
Given the lack of experience with market economies, Latin
American regulations should narrowly define price discrimination
policies. Price discrimination may actually increase competition: as
firms offer selected customers price discounts, other firms may re-
spond in a similar fashion, and the general price level will fall. An
active price discrimination policy would deter competition before it
starts and deprive the public of lower prices. Thus, antitrust policy
should limit price discrimination to situations where the target
firm holds a monopoly position and uses price discrimination to
deter entry. Nonetheless, even in these cases, courts should use a
rule-of-reason analysis to avoid adversely affecting efficiency. Ty-
ing policies should also have limits to avoid chilling innovative
marketing strategies.
169. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
170. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
171. Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
172. Treaty of Rome, supra note 102, art. 86. For example, in Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti,
1987 O.J. (L 65) 19, the court ruled that Hilti tied the sale of cartridge strips for its nail gun
to the sale of its nails, thereby preventing competition on its nails. For further information,
see BONER & KRUEGER, supra note 44, at 62-63.
173. Case 27/76 United Brands Co. & Bands Continental B.V. v. Commission, 1978
E.C.R. 207, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8429 (1978). United
Brands had a policy of selling bananas for different prices in different EEC countries. The
court held that the discriminatory pricing served as an obstacle to trade. Id.




During the twentieth century, antitrust policy has evolved
along two tracks, market power and dominance. In the United
States, antitrust policy generally addresses the issue of market
power, making illegal many activities that explicitly or implicitly
lead to higher consumer prices. This analysis captures the basic
monopoly issues and addresses oligopoly concepts where a group of
firms behaves as a monopoly. The courts, however, often infer the
adverse effect on competition from market structure, rendering
empirical evidence of poor performance unnecessary. In other
cases, the law precludes specific behavior, regardless of effects.
In the EEC and in a number of European countries, antitrust
policy has evolved to control both agreements and the dominance
of large firms. This dominance concern extends beyond monopoly
behavior and potentially affects all business relationships of large
firms. In effect, antitrust policy protects the commercial opportu-
nity of small firms at the expense of the large firms. Thus, domi-
nance policies limit the competitive tactics of large firms. Under
certain conditions, such restrictions are anti-competitive.
Antitrust laws in Latin America are evolving to address the
issues of market power and large firm dominance. However, wide-
spread government ownership in the economy, the existence of
price controls, and import-substitution policies have combined to
reduce the enforcement of antitrust laws. As the region adopts
market-oriented policies and attempts to safeguard the competi-
tive process, the need to implement antitrust policy becomes more
evident. Countries like Peru and Venezuela have recognized this
need and have passed antitrust legislation.
The Latin American economies need not choose between the
traditional market power and dominance approaches to antitrust
policy. Instead, they can consider a hybrid policy that focuses only
on the general problems of monopolies. This approach would avoid
the pitfalls of a market-power-based policy in which the govern-
ment attacks business practices or mergers based on speculative
oligopoly theories of anti-competitive effect. Moreover, this ap-
proach would sidestep the problems associated with an over-inclu-
sive definition of dominance, thereby limiting challenges of alleged
predation, non-price horizontal restraints, and vertical restraints to
those situations where enforcement is necessary to control monop-
oly power. Within a monopoly policy, the government must regu-
[Vol. 24:1
ANTITRUST IN LATIN AMERICA
late itself to ensure that other governmental policies do not create
barriers to entry. Thus, as part of its general advocacy role, an op-
timal antitrust policy must prevent monopolies, whether generated
by government or business.
For Latin American countries, prohibitions on price fixing
should represent the core antitrust policy. If narrowly defined to
include only agreements on price and related customer allocations,
the regulations could employ a per se methodology. Antitrust poli-
cies should control mergers and predation only if the behavior
tends to create a monopoly without generating offsetting efficien-
cies. Other behavior, such as non-price horizontal agreements, ver-
tical restraints, and price discrimination schemes could justify en-
forcement actions when a firm or a coordinated group of firms with
monopoly power utilizes such agreements without efficiency justifi-
cations. However, analyzing these types of behavior will be compli-
cated and will require significant enforcement resources. Given the
meager benefits to be gained from blocking these activities, en-
forcement priorities should not include non-price horizontal agree-
ments, vertical restraints, or price discrimination.
1992]
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APPENDIX A
LATIN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
ARGENTINA
Represi6n de los trusts [Antitrust], Law 11,210 of Aug. 24,
1923, translated in LAWS OF ARGENTINA IN ENGLISH 899
(J.A. de Marval & E. de Marval trans., 1933), repealed by
Represi6n de monopolios, Law 12,906 of Dec. 12, 1946,
C6DIGO DE COMERCIO Y LEYES COMPLEMENTARIAS ANOTADOS
[C.C.L.C.A.], at 1071 (2d ed. 1970), repealed by Ley de
defensa de la compentencia, Law 22,262 of Aug. 1, 1980,
ANALES DE LEGISLACI6N ARGENTINA [A.D.L.A.], at 2521
(1980).
BOLIVIA
CONSTITUCI6N art. 134; CODIGO PENAL art. 233.
BRAZIL
CONSTITUIVAO DA REPfJBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL [BRAZ.
CONST.] art. 170; Lei que disciplina a repress~o ao abruso
do poder econmico, Law 4,137 of Sept. 10, 1962, 26
LEGISLACAO FEDERAL E MARGINALIA 314 (1962); Decree No.
52,025 of May 20, 1963, 203 Revista Forense [R.F.] 422
(1963) (approving the regulation of Brazilian Law 4,137);
Decree No. 92,323 of Jan. 23, 1986, 293 R.F. 592 (1986)
(approving the regulation of Brazilian Law 4,137); Law
8137 of Dec. 27, 1990, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], Dec. 28, 1990
(defining crimes against tributary and economic order);
Law 8158 of Jan. 8, 1991, D.O., Jan. 9, 1991 (setting out
rules to protect competition).
CHILE
Law No. 13,305, tit. V, arts. 172-182, DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.], Apr. 6, 1959, amended by Law Decree No. 211 of
1973, D.O., Dec. 22, 1973, amended by Decree No. 511 of




PRACTICAS COMERCIALES RESTRICTIVAS, NUEVO C6DIGO DE
COMERCIO [NuEvo COD. COM.] arts. 7269-1 to 7299-4 (The
new code of July-Sept. 1991 compiles Law 155 of Dec. 14,





CONSTITUCION art. 276 (1940).
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
CONSTITUCI6N art. 8, para. 12; CODIGO DE COMERCIO.
ECUADOR
CONSTITUCIN art. 45; Executive Decree
1987.




CODIGO DE COMERcIo arts. 361-67.
HAIT1
2
CONSTITUTI6N DE LA REPUBLIQUE D'HAITI art. 190 (1987).
HONDURAS
CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE HONDURAS art. 339.
1. The 1940 Constitution was the last constitution under a free-market economy. Since
Cuba has become communist, the constitution no longer reflects free-market philosophy.
2. In 1991, a military coup overthrew the government and disbanded the 1987
Constitution.
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MEXICO
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICA-
NOs art. 28; Ley organica del articulo 28 constitucional en
materia de monopolios [Organic Law of Monopolies],
DIARIO OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACION [D.O.], Aug. 31, 1934,
amended by Decree of Dec. 27, 1979, D.O., Jan. 8, 1980,
repealed and replaced by Ley federal de compentencia
econ6mica [Federal Law of Economic Competition], D.O.,
Dec. 24, 1992.
NICARAGUA s
CONSTITucI6N POLITICA DE NICARAGUA art. 67 (1974).
PANAMA
CONSTITUcI6N POLITICA DE LA REP(JBLICA DE PANAMA arts.
290-93.
PARAGUAY
LA CONSTITucI6N PARAGUAYA CONCORDA art. 95.
PERU
4
CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL PERU art. 188 (1979); Law De-
cree No. 701 of July 11, 1991, [19911 NORMAS LEGALES 126.
URUGUAY
CONSTITUCI(N art. 85, para. 17.
VENEZUELA
CONSTITUCION art. 97; Ley para promover y proteger el
ejercicio de la libre competencia [Law to Promote and
Protect the Exercise of Free Competition], G.O. No.
34.880 of Jan. 13, 1992, GACETA LEGAL-RAMIREZ & GARAY,
Jan. 15, 1992.
3. The 1974 Constitution was in effect prior to the Sandinista regime coming to power.
4. In 1992, a military coup disbanded the 1979 Constitution.
19921
